



# IED TM Lesson 3: Syndicate Exercises



# Overview

3.1.1 Threat Assessment

3.1.2 Convoy Planning

3.1.3 Static Force Protection



# Terminal Learning Objectives

To exercise and consolidate the participants' knowledge and skills on threat assessment processes and mitigation techniques by means of map exercises and briefing.



## 3.1.2 Threat Assessment

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
# Exercise 1 – Aggressor Intent

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# Training Objective and Methodology

To encourage the participants to understand how an IED aggressors' intentions determines their method of IED attack. This will enable the participants to subsequently develop and interpret threat assessments.

This exercises will be conducted as a syndicate.



# Exercise 1 – Threat Assessment Part 1

## **Situation.**

You are a member of the Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) a separatist group who opposes the current government and the UN Peacekeeping Force in CARANA. See CARANA Country Profile for details on this group. You are part of a small terrorist cell within the CISC trying to demonstrate that you are a professional IED cell capable of conducting deadly attacks.

In response to recent news that the UN will commit peace enforcement troops to Operations in support of the stabilization of CARANA. Due to the worsening security situation, a number of non-essential UN civilian staff are being evacuated from the country via the sea port at TOLE. You have been ordered to plan and execute an attack on UN workers within the attached area. Your intelligence has reported that an UN troop carrier ship will be arriving in TOLE to evacuate the UN staff from CARANA within the next 48–72 hours. We have discovered that this ship will berth somewhere within the area shown.

It is believed that the UN staff will be arriving in small groups (10-15) in civilian vehicles with Carana National Police (CNP) escorts. They are 3 known entry points to the port (as shown on the map). UN staff are currently housed both West and East of the city but their routes to the port are not known.

CISC have a sympathetic security guard who works at the port – some degree of access without being searched may be possible. The security guard will not take part in any attack and will have to be briefed on any action you require.

# Exercise 1 – Threat Assessment Part 1

## **Capability.**

- Shoot - Small arms only (no heavy weapons), No RPGs.
- IED Capability: – Explosives - Large quantities (up to 500Kg) HME. – Small quantities 4-5 Kg C4. – Detonators. – Initiation switches
- Command Wire, Radio Command.
- Time Delay.
- Basic Victim Operated (pressure plates, tripwires, anti-lift) switches.



# Exercise 1 – Threat Assessment Part 1

## **Your Mission:**

You and your team are to carry out an attack to kill and injure as many UN staff as possible in order to deter the UN from becoming involved and to demonstrate that CISC are a credible force.

# Exercise 1 – Threat Assessment Part 1

## Limitations

- You have little public support in most of the operating area so the public will not overtly support you and all resources must be brought into the area prior to the attack.
- After the attack, your safe haven is 35km to the North-West over the border in SUMORA.

The leadership of the CISC has invoked the following restrictions on you:

- The attack must be filmed.
- The attack must take place either in or close to the port area to prove to the world that the UN military machine cannot even protect its own people against the CISC.
- We do not wish for any of the cell to martyr themselves during this operation so you must consider and extraction plan.
- Your team consists of 5 members.

The map displays the Republic of the Congo with its provinces: MARONI, GALASI, HANNO, KOLONI, SUROUN, BARIN, DE CARANA, FOLSA, MAHBEK, FARON, ALUR, and TERENI. Neighboring countries include the République Islamique de Sumora to the north, République Démocratique to the east, République Populaire Katasienne to the south, and République du Rimosa to the south-east. The map also shows the République de la République and the République de la République. A red rectangle highlights a specific area in the north-eastern part of the country, near the border with the Central African Republic.



# Map in General






# Port in General





# Port in Detail – Entry Point 1





## Port in Detail – Entry Point 2






# Port in Detail – Entry Point 3





# Port in Detail – Berthing Point



Expected  
berth point  
for UN ship

Likely temporary  
holding area for UN  
personnel

# EXERCISE REQUIREMENT

The CISC Cell Commander will be here shortly. You have 45 min to plan. He will expect a 10 min brief from you. You are to:

1. Produce a trace/overlay/sketch of the attack identifying all Contact Points (intended explosion site), Firing Points (triggerman location), escape routes, and relevant locations.
2. Then brief your plan in detail.

Your plan must include:

- a) A brief scheme of manoeuvre (the outline of the plan with key timings)
- b) Your intent – who are you specifically targeting and why? Who do you not want to harm and why?
- c) Capability – what specific type of attack/IED are you going to use?
- d) Opportunity – Where and when will the attack take place?
- e) Expected outcome of attack.
- f) Reasons why this location and method of attack has been chosen.
- g) Identification of the biggest risks involved in this plan.
- h) Any other relevant information you feel necessary.

Any information that you would seek to gain on reconnaissance will be available from the instructors.



# Questions?





# Threat Assessment


## Exercise 2 – Application

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# Training Objective and Methodology

To confirm the understanding of the threat assessment process and output. The aim is to highlight the threat triad and conduct an accurate threat assessment.

These exercises will be done by the participants in their syndicate groups.



# Exercise 2 – Threat Assessment Part 2

## **Situation.**

You are an IED threat Mitigation Advisor working in a Battalion as part of the UN Mission in CARANA (UNMIC). Your battalion was deployed as part of a peacekeeping force to help respond to the instability caused by insurgent groups operating in CARANA seeking to overthrow the legitimate government. Your battalion is located in a Main Operating Base. One of the Companies in your Battalion is located in a nearby Forward Operating Base near a small village to provide local security.

In addition to normal vehicle patrols, the Company conducts regular foot patrols through the centre of village to reassure the population and deter the insurgent group from gaining popular support.


The patrols tend to take place in the morning before the heat of the day and they always use the route shown either clockwise or anti clockwise, normally stopping for a water break on route. The local population routinely use this same routes in the village area but they do not use the routes near the FOB area.

A friendly source of intelligence suggest that a small number of insurgents have moved into the area and wish to mount an attack against UN troops to undermine their capability and discourage them from conducting patrols. This will give the insurgents greater freedom of movement and opportunity to influence the population and gain support.

The insurgents operating in CARANA are known to have the capability to carry out all types of IED attacks and have access to both home made explosives and military ordnance.




# Map in General





# Map in Detail





# Map in Detail



# Exercise Requirement

## **Situation.**

As the Threat mitigation advisor you are to carry out a threat assessment and make recommendations of what the Company could do to reduce the threat of an attack.

Your syndicate must, as a minimum;

- Complete the threat assessment using the 6Ws.
- Specifically identify the VPs and VA's and be able to qualify them. i.e. explain why they are VA's and VPs.
- Identify the most likely type of attack at the VP/VA.
- Make recommendations of what the FOB could do to reduce the threat.

You have 45 minutes to carry out the assessment. You are to provide a 10-minute brief to the class on your assessment and recommendations.

## Exercise 2 – Threat Assessment Part 2

### Supplementary Activity – Group Discussion

Following your advice the Company FOB has made the following changes to their activity:

- The FOB has redesigned it's sentry positions so they have greater visibility of the area.
- Foot patrols no longer stop in the same locations for water breaks,
- Foot patrols vary their routes slightly.


Look at the new map (next slide)

As a class discuss the following:

- Where are the new VPs?
- What could the FOB do to minimize the threat even further?



# Map in General





# Questions?





## 3.1.2 FOB Protection Exercise

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# Training Objective and Methodology

To encourage the participants to develop their understanding of how to consider and mitigate IED threats against fixed positions (for example, a FOB, VCP, Police Building, etc). The aim is to highlight the actions that planning and operations staffs can evaluate, or implement, to mitigate IED threats.

These exercises will be done by the participants in their syndicate groups.

# Situation

- An Infantry Company is based in a Forward Operating Base (FOB) in in the CARANA where UNAC Mission is established.
- 3 Weeks ago there was an attempt by an insurgent group to overrun a nearby FOB in in the same sector. The attack was initiated a VBIED which breached the FOB wall. The insurgents managed to gain entry to the FOB and were almost successful in capturing, but by luck an aviation QRF arrived in time to repel the insurgent. The attack killed and wounded a significant number of TCCs as well as damaging equipment.
- Intelligence reports indicate that the insurgents were able to survey the nearby FOB and identified the gaps and enabled them plan for an attack. Intelligence suggests that the insurgents, confident after their attack, will look to conduct further attacks to discredit the UN forces.



# Situation

- You are the Company Commander, and also FOB Commander. Following the recent attack in the nearby FOB you have been tasked to make an assessment of the FOB and come up with mitigation measures to prevent any future attempts to over your FOB.
- You need to develop a Surveillance Target Acquisition Plan (STAP) to counter possible threats to the FOB. You also need to identify physical improvements to the FOB.
- Improvements to the FOB need to be made as soon as possible and you should develop a prioritized list of measures.

## Additional Information

- The Sector Commander has allocated the following resources to make the improvements:
- 500 baskets of Mil 1 Hesco (1 basket is 1Mt3 in size)
- 1km of razor wire
- One light-wheeled tractor (loader)
- 1 tippers
- One squad (7 Soldiers, 1 NCO) of engineers (attached for 3 weeks). Engineers are typically equipped with shovels, pickaxes, and one chain saw.
- 1 x task line of UAS will be available on request for 4hours per day.


# Exercise Requirements

1. Develop a Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan (STAP) for the FOB.
2. Assess the FOB design and make specific recommendations for improving the FOB security. As a minimum you need to address the following:
  - The design of the Entry Control Point (ECP)
  - The FOB wall and terrain within the effective range of the weapon systems (200 meters)
  - The sentry positions
  - Ensure you prioritize the tasks you want to complete and consider it in the context of the resources you have available to you.

**Any assumptions should be cleared with the Instructor before detailed planning.**

**Any information that you would seek to gain will be available from the instructors.**

# Map in General



# Map in General





# Map in General




# Map in Detail – SW Corner





# Map in Detail – SE Corner





# Map in Detail – West Border





# Map in Detail – East Border





# Map in Detail – Dead Ground





# Questions?





## 3.1.3 Convoy Planning Exercise

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# Training Objective and Methodology

To assess the participants on their understanding on how to conduct route analysis and threat analysis of a particular route and present a threat assessment of the route and plan how to conduct convoy movement in IED threat environment.

These exercises will be done by the participants in their syndicate groups.



## Exercise 3 – Convoy Planning

You are the IED Threat Mitigation Advisor working in a Battalion HQ. A new Forward Operating Base (FOB) is planned to be built in a remote area of Sector 2 approximately 25km North West of your current location.

Following the UNSCR 1544 (2023) a Bn FOB was established near PIKSEK to provide security from a rising insurgent activity targeting security forces in the NORTH WEST of CARANA. The UN Assistance Force to CARANA (UNAC) Bn in the area was initially highly effective but in recent months the insurgent groups have increased their activity targeting remote local security force outposts and resorting more and more to the use of IEDs as a weapon. Increasingly, UN troops are the target of insurgent attacks. A decision has been made to establish a new Company level FOB to the south of TRITH to support local security forces and deny freedom of movement to the insurgents.

## Exercise 3 – Convoy Planning

**Enemy Forces.** Insurgent forces remain active to the NORTH of PIKSEK. They are well trained and resourced and retain the capability to launch well-planned, coordinated operations. The insurgents have shown the capacity to make a variety of IEDs and they are known to be well equipped with small arms (mainly AK style weapons). The insurgents are politically motivated not ideologically/religiously motivated and so suicide attacks are extremely rare. They tend to operate in small cells of about 30 fighters but they will rarely be found in groups larger than eight to avoid being identified. They do not wear a uniform, opting to dress in local attire. They use normal civilian vehicles and motorcycles. The insurgents also make use of the restrictive high terrain which can only be accessed by foot. There is assessed to be one cell operating in the area of operations. The insurgents do not target civilians as they do not want antagonize the local population who, although do not support the insurgents, also tolerate their presence out of fear of retribution. Occasionally IEDs are used to initiate complex attack type ambushes in both rural and urban areas.


## Exercise 3 – Convoy Planning

**Friendly Forces.** The security situation in close proximity to PIKSEK has stabilized. In order to improve the security force's presence, a Forward Operating Base (FOB) location has been identified in to te SOUTH of TRITH and an operation to secure it is to be completed in the coming weeks. An infantry company group with an EOD team attached has been tasked to secure and clear the site prior to construction work starting.

**Mission.** UNAC Bn is to conduct convoy support between PIKSEK and TRITH in order to allow a new FOB to be CONSTRUCTED and subsequently DENY insurgents freedom of movement.



# Country Map






# Country Map



# Map in General





## EXERCISE REQUIREMENT

You are the IED TM advisor to your HQ. You are to give a decision brief to the commander on risk reduction for the movement to the new FOB, as part of the wider mission planning.

Read the student handout and supplementary information.

You are also to:

- Carry out a Threat Assessment
- Carry out a route analysis:
- Plan a convoy move implementing threat mitigations measures and coordinating all supporting assets.

Specific details of your tasks can be found in the student handout.

# Exercise 3 – Convoy Planning

## SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

# Exercise 3 – Convoy Planning

## Assets.

- Mobility Company – 2 x Infantry Platoons. Each Platoon consists of 30 pax and 3 x Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC). Each Platoon has 1 x trained search team equipped with detectors.
- 2 x IEDD team. Each Team consists of 2 pax and their equipment incl ROV. They do not have a vehicle and rely on transport being provided for them.
- 1 x Engr Sqn. This includes:
  - Construction troop – 30 pax in 3 x soft skin trucks
  - 8 x Logistics vehicles to move the construction materiel for the new FOB
  - Plant detachment (1 x grader, 1 x front-end loader, 1 x back-hoe and 1 x recovery vehicle). Max speed of this detachment is 20km/hr



# Exercise 3 – Convoy Planning

## **Assets.**

Electronic Counter Measures (Jammers):

- 2 x portable ECM units. Range 40m.
- 6 x vehicle mounted ECM fitted to each APC. Range 50m.

UAV detachment:

- 1 detachment based in the Bn HQ location.
- Maximum distance the UAV can fly from base station – 50km
- Maximum flight time – 6 hours. After this it requires 4 hours to be refueled and maintained before re-deployment.
- Has full colour motion video, Night Vision or thermal imaging but only 1 camera can be used at a time. Switching between cameras requires UAV to be returned to base station and swapped, this will take 4 hours.


## Exercise 3 – Convoy Planning

### **Assets.**

#### Local Security Forces:

- There is a local police checkpoint near the planned FOB location and a main police station in the town of PIKSEK.
- They can be requested to support by setting up police checkpoints but they are limited in number and have few vehicles. This means they will only conduct checkpoints in close proximity to their stations and will only be able to maintain 1 checkpoint per police post.
- The local police have an awareness in CIED and can conduct basic vehicle and person searches if needed.

# Human Terrain




The nomadic population to the north is small. They are neutral towards UN troops but they are not supportive. They also do not want to antagonize the insurgent groups so will avoid any acts of support to the UN or local security forces.

Population around the small town near the HQ are generally supportive of local security forces and UN troops who spend their money in local business. Although the local population are supportive of the UN cause, the insurgents are trying to win over their support to further their cause.



# Physical Terrain



High ground generally steep sided rocky hills with little vegetation. Severely restricted to vehicles

Acacia forest. Movement by vehicle is restricted to tracks and roads.


Open semi arid scrubland interspered with seasonal rivers. When dry it is unrestricted to most wheeled vehicles. After heavy rains movement is restricted to roads. Following rains the seasonal rivers can only be crossed at established crossing points.

# Exercise 3 – Convoy Planning

Location	When	Incident Type	Description
1	12 Months ago	Timed IED	Large IED assessed to be targeting local police forces who set up daily check point at bridge.
2	9 months ago	Victim operated IED	Assessed to be a pressure plate IED using HME. Target was newly arrived UN troops who had occupied the nearby FOB. IED destroyed 1 x APC killing 4 soldiers and injuring a further 5.
3	9 months ago	Victim operated IED	Assessed to be a pressure plate IED using HME. Target was newly arrived UN troops who had occupied the nearby FOB. IED destroyed a UN patrol vehicle killing 4 soldiers.
4	9 months ago	Command IED	Confirmed command wire IED using military ordinance. The IED targeted a UN logistics vehicle in a convoy. The attack was followed with small arms attack.
5	More than 1 year ago	Unknown	IED attack targeting local security forces.
6	4 weeks ago	Command IED	Assessed Radio Controlled IED targeting UN patrol. The IED was found during a route search as destroyed in situ by IEDD team.
7	5 months ago	Command IED	Command wire IED targeting a local security force vehicle. The device was placed on a narrow culvert. The device killed an unknown number of local police.
8	3 weeks ago	Victim operated IED	Assessed directional victim operated device. This targeted searchers who had been following the same isolation route after the culvert crossing had been determined as a vulnerable point. The device was found and destroyed in situ.
9	6 months ago	Timed IED	Assessed timed IED. This device appeared to be targeting local police who set up daily vehicle checkpoint on the road going North West. The device functioned but only caused minor injuries.
10	3 months ago	Victim operated IED	Assessed pressure plate IED. IED functioned damaging a UN APC. No soldiers were killed but the driver sustained injuries.
11	7 months ago	Command IED	Assessed command IED functioned halting a UN convoy. The IED attack was followed up by heavy small arms attack from the high ground to the East. The attack was repelled but the lead vehicle driver and commander were killed.
12	2 weeks ago	Victim operated IED	Unknown type of VO IED targeting local security forces.




# Map in General






# Map in Detail 1





# Map in Detail 2






# Map in Detail 3





# Map in Detail 4






# Map in Detail 5






# Map in Detail 6






# Map in Detail 7






# Map in Detail 8





# Map in Detail 9





# Questions?

